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BRIEF 
ENT
 M THE UTAH COURT OF APPALS ^ g Q g 
00O00 
vanza Eckersley Boyle,, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark K. Boyle, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
OPINION J R C B 
Case No. 860004-CA 
F I L E D Defendant 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Bench. ' * *— »— »• 
APR 151987 
GREENWOOD, J u d g e : TimothyM.Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court at Appeals 
Plaintiff appeals from a Decree of Divorce which 
distributed property and debts between the parties, cancelled a 
pre-marital note executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff, 
denied plaintiff alimony, and granted a divorce to both parties. 
The parties married in 1974 when plaintiff was 56 years 
old and defendant 63. Both had prior marriages. They 
separated in 1981 and had no children born of their marriage. 
Prior to the marriage plaintiff owned a home and had 
substantial savings. Defendant borrowed $8,000 from plaintiff 
for payment of taxes prior to the marriage and executed a note 
reflecting that loan. Some repayment occurred after the 
marriage. Plaintiffs assets were partially depleted during 
the marriage by purchase of a home and automobiles. Plaintiff 
also provided funds to defendant for payment of gambling 
debts. Defendant, an attorney, contributed his income during 
the marriage to the couple's living expenses. Plaintiff 
deposited $9,300 of her pre-marital assets in a joint Merrill 
Lynch account with an initial total balance of $20,000. After 
the parties separated they each withdrew funds from the Merrill 
Lynch account, creating an overdraft of approximately $10,000. 
After three days of trial the trial court awarded 
plaintiff the home of the parties subject to the mortgage 
obligation, the household furnishings, a 1975 Cadillac, a 
savings account in her name, and various personal items. 
Plaintiff and defendant were each ordered to repay one-half of 
the Merrill Lynch overdraft balance. Defendant was awarded his 
Keogh plan, a country club membership, a 1975 Blazer, his 
pension plan, and various personal items. Defendant was also 
ordered to pay plaintiffs medical bills and all back taxes 
owed through 1981. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused its 
discretion by (1) refusing to order defendant to pay to 
plaintiff the balance of the $8,000 note and other sums 
advanced by plaintiff to defendant during the marriage for 
payment of gambling debts; (2) ordering plaintiff to pay 
one-half of the Merrill Lynch overdraft; (3) failing to award 
plaintiff alimony; and (4) granting a divorce to defendant as 
well as to plaintiff. We disagree and affirm the decision of 
the trial court. 
This Court will refrain from disturbing findings of the 
trial court in a divorce action unless a clear abuse of 
discretion is shown. Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1974). The trial court is clearly in the best position to 
weigh the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual 
conclusions. In this case the trial judge considered all 
evidence presented as to the marital assets and debts as they 
existed prior to and during the marriage, and subsequent to the 
separation of the parties. It would be inappropriate for this 
Court to reverse on an isolated item of property or debt 
distribution. Rather, this Court must examine the entire 
distribution to determine if the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
The findings of fact do not include dollar values for 
most of the property and debts distributed, nor does the record 
indicate any effort by plaintiff's counsel, who drafted those 
pleadings for court approval, to have such amounts delineated. 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), appellant claimed 
that the trial court had improperly distributed property. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated that findings of fact must include 
valuation of assets in order to permit appellate review. In 
Jones, as here, counsel for the party seeking such review had 
prepared the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of 
divorce and had not included, nor attempted to include, values 
in those pleadings. The Supreme Court declined to disturb the 
property distribution, stating that such claim had been waived 
because the party seeking reversal failed to attempt to include 
property values in the findings of fact. Jones at 1074-75. We 
agree that a failure to include property valuations in divorce 
actions may, in some cases, constitute an abuse of discretion 
sufficient to require remand for determination of values. 
However, when the lack of valuation results from the 
complaining party's own draftsmanship and no clear abuse of 
discretion is otherwise proven, we will defer to the trial 
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court's pni|n-Mty distribution. Those factors exist in the case 
before us and we therefore affirm as to property and debt 
6i vi sion. 
Plaintiff claims the court !'uiLhei abused its discretion 
by failing to award her alimony. Medical testimony was 
received regarding plaintiff's asthma condition and the adverse 
effect on her ability to be employed. Cross-examination 
indicated that plaintiff was able to golf frequently despite 
the asthma, and had been the runner-up in a competition held at 
Willow Creek Country Club in 1982. Defendant testified that 
income from his law practice had diminished dramatically. His 
area of practice, motor carrier transportation law# had 
suffered from the deregulation of that industry. Also, his 
major client had terminated their relationship. Defendant 
anticipated a continued reduction of his salary for those 
reasons. The court refused plaintiff's request to include a 
finding that plaintiff was unable t? work. The findings, 
however, do include the following lan'ma ;--: 
That this wab not a long LCOII marriage, and the 
court feels that each party is being restored 
to the condition which existed at the time of 
the marriage, and therefore no alimony shoiild 
be awarded. (Finding;, of F<••*<:: ^ 1 8 ) . 
The Utah Supre*a^ _... ; ic a; the purpose UJ-
is to equalize the standard of living for both spouses, 
maintain them at their present standard as much as possible, 
and avoid the necessity of one spouse receiving public 
assistance* Hiqley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983) 
Jones, the Court reiterated the factors to be examined in 
determining raony as including: 
[1 f; i uainw *.. * needs ni 
the WJ r.e; 
[2] the ability M the Wife to produ." a 
sufficient income: fir herself; and 
[3] t\\e- ^ ' ; ; K f * h*--- husb<--'». ;-:-.>vide 
SUDDr* * 
These criteria wc= . .t:viouKi>* :doptr.-d in English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-1/ (Drab 1977), m Jones the ^o»?rt 
examined the record for an anajy^ib of rne criteria, and 
considered, among other thinys, i.h* length of the marriage ana 
the recipient spouse's education and employability. The Jones 
analysis process made it clear that the three pronged criterie-
does nut, preclude considering factors such as the length of * v 
marriao' ~ awarding alimony. 
iltiOOn I i "A 3 
In Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) the Utah 
Supreme Court recently listed the same three factors and stated 
that M[f]ailure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse 
of discretion.- In Paffel the trial court's findings did not 
specifically address all of the required factors. This Court 
concurs in the Supreme Court's reflection that more detailed 
findings on each required factor would assist in the appellate 
process. However, we find/ as did the Supreme Court in Paffel, 
that "the evidence in this case supports the lower court's 
order and appellant has made no showing to rebut the 
presumption that the trial court did consider respondent's 
income, expenses, and need for support."' Id at 102. The third 
factor, defendant's ability to provide support, was also 
considered by the trial court in this case. Appellant was 
awarded most of the marital estate as well as the residue of 
her premarital assets. She had received several months of 
temporary support to give her an opportunity to rehabilitate. 
Evidence was received and disputed as to plaintiff's ability to 
obtain employment, given her health conditions. Plaintiff had 
worked up to eight years prior to the marriage of the parties. 
Defendant testified that his income had decreased and was not 
likely to increase, because of the change in the nature of his 
law practice. The short marriage of the parties resulted in a 
diminution of both plaintiff's assets and defendant's earning 
abilities. The trial court considered all proffered evidence 
and rendered a decision to equalize, as far as possible, the 
adverse impact of the divorce on both. All three of the 
factors required by Paffel were considered by the court. This 
court finds no abuse of discretion in the denial of alimony. 
There is no merit in plaintiff's contention that defendant 
should not have been granted a divorce. Both parties testified 
on their grounds for divorce and it was within the sound 
discretion of the trial judge to grant a divorce to both. 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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